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The Canadian Pugwash Group1 submits this Brief on Nuclear 
Weapons Issues to the Government of Canada for its Dialogue on Foreign 
Policy.  The Brief responds to two Questions for Discussion: 
 
· “What should be our distinctive role in promoting global 
security?” 
 
· “Should Canada do more to address conditions giving rise to 
conflict and insecurity beyond our borders?  If so, where?” 
 
 
A.  Current Canadian Policy 
 
 Foreign Minister Bill Graham recapitulated the priorities of Canada’s 
non-proliferation arms control and disarmament policy in his address to the 
Conference on Disarmament March 19, 2002. 
 
We seek the total elimination of all weapons of mass 
destruction.  To that end we will work to achieve the full 
implementation of the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 
2000 NPT Review Conference.  In that context, we want 
early entry into force of the CTBT and, in the interim, the 
most effective organization we can devise to support the 
treaty regime.  The political value of nuclear weapons 
must be devalued, particularly because their purpose is 
primarily political.  The negative security assurances 
provided by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear 
weapon states party to the NPT are a vital element in 
international security and must be preserved and 
respected. … 
 
 The Minister called for vigilance in protecting the legal regime that 
underpins the multilateral system. 
 
                                                 
1  The Canadian Pugwash Group is the Canadian branch of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, 
which, along with its then President, Sir Joseph Rotblat, was awarded the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to 
diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to diminish such arms.”. 
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Our societies are based on the rule of law, and the sustainable, 
shared global future we seek must have the same basis, 
however difficult it may be to obtain universal acceptance of 
the rules and establish effective means of enforcement. 
 
 Canada showed its commitment to the NPT 13 Steps (see Appendix 
“A”) by voting in favour of the New Agenda Coalition omnibus resolution, 
“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World:  The Need for a New Agenda,” at 
UNGA 57.  Canada was the only NATO country to vote yes. 
 
 The resolution upheld inter alia: 
 
· A call for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad 
hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament; 
 
· Entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 
maintenance of the moratorium on test explosions; 
 
· Resumption of negotiations on a treaty banning the production 
of fissile materials; 
 
· Prevention of an arms race in outer space; 
 
· Nuclear Weapons States to maintain security assurances not to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. 
 
· Destruction of all nuclear warheads affected by the treaty 
process to make nuclear disarmament irreversible. 
 
· Requirement, ultimately, of a universal, multilaterally 
negotiated legally binding instrument for a nuclear-weapon-free 
world. 
 
At the same time, Canada abstained on a second New Agenda 
Coalition resolution calling for tactical nuclear weapons to be included as an 
integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.  The 
resolution was aimed at the removal of the 180 U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons stationed on the soil of six European NATO countries, which call 
themselves non-nuclear:  Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and 
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Turkey.  The abstention was caused by Canada’s reluctance to oppose 
NATO policy.  The NATO Strategic Concept holds that nuclear weapons are 
“essential” and must be kept up-to-date as “credible deterrence.”  Referring 
to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in European countries, NATO 
says:  “There is a clear rationale for a continued, though much reduced, 
presence of sub-strategic forces in Europe.” 
 
Canada’s efforts to get NATO to review its nuclear weapons policies 
flowed from the 1998 report of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade.  The Committee, chaired by Bill Graham, 
M.P. (before he assumed his present portfolio), urged Canada to “argue 
forcefully” within NATO for a re-examination of the nuclear component in 
the Strategic Concept.  A review of sorts was started, but it came to naught, 
with NATO re-affirming the central tenet of the Strategic Concept:  nuclear 
weapons are “essential”.  While the NATO document makes it clear that the 
“Paragraph 32” process is finished, the door was left open to further 
discussion on the question.  Paragraph 96 of the NATO Report of December 
14, 2000, said:  “… The Alliance will continue to broaden its engagement 
with interested nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions and 
the general public.”  NATO further acknowledged that it is important for 
NATO Allies to maintain and reinvigorate the flow of information with and 
about relevant international bodies in this field (Paragraph 115). 
 
The Government of Canada should be commended for having raised 
this issue in NATO, but its efforts cannot stop now.  The gravest threat to the 
viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now posed by the actions of the 
United States, our closest ally.  Canada, to be true to its deepest values 
centering on the rule of law, cannot be silent. 
 
The contradiction between what NATO countries say in the NPT 
context and do in the NATO context is astounding.  The very same countries 
– including Canada – that, in the NPT context, pledge an “unequivocal 
undertaking” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons then, in the NATO 
context, reaffirm that nuclear weapons “are essential.”  Through its 
commitment to the NPT and the 13 Steps for total elimination of nuclear 
weapons and, at the same time, its allegiance to NATO, Canada is caught in 
an incoherent posture.  The contradiction of Canada’s nuclear weapons 
policies going in two opposite directions at the same time must be dealt 
with.  Canadian Pugwash subscribes to the analysis of this dilemma 
presented by Project Ploughshares: 
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Nearly sixty years after the advent of the nuclear age, Canada 
still maintains a fundamentally ambiguous policy toward 
nuclear weapons.  The Canadian government rules out 
acquiring its own nuclear weapons, opposes nuclear 
proliferation, and asserts that “the only sustainable strategy for 
the future is the elimination of nuclear weapons entirely.”  But 
it also supports the continued possession of nuclear weapons by 
its allies, participates in a nuclear-armed alliance, and endorses 
NATO’s plan to retain nuclear weapons “for the foreseeable 
future.”  The Canadian government continues to state that the 
defence of Canada must rely on the “nuclear umbrella” that the 
United States and other NATO allies have unfurled above this 
country, and it continues to provide both physical and political 
support for those weapons in a variety of ways.  In short, while 
the Canadian government condemns any reliance on nuclear 
weapons by non-allied countries, it continues to treat those 
same weapons as a useful – even necessary – element of 
Canada’s defences and those of its allies.2 
 
 
B.  New Policy Directions on Nuclear Weapons. 
  
Contrary to popular belief, the nuclear weapons problem is not “going 
away.” 
 
It is staggering to reflect on the total number of nuclear weapons still 
in existence.  The estimated number is 34,145. 
                                                 
2  “Canada and Nuclear Weapons:  Canadian Policies Related to, and Connections to, Nuclear Weapons,” By Bill 
Robinson, Project Ploughshares Working Paper 01-5, October, 2002. 
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 Country Strategic 
Warheads 
Tactical 
Warheads 
Warheads 
in Storage 
TOTAL 
 
United States 7,013 1,620 5,000 13,633 
Russia 5,858 4,000 9,421 19,279 
TOTAL 32,912 
Percent of Total 
 
96 percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is a counterproductive political policy for the five permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council to think that they can have almost an 
exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons while other countries are 
prohibited from acquiring them.  The responsibility for the looming prospect 
of a nuclear war of some dimension can be laid squarely on the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China.  They have been 
warned time and again by both governments and civil society leaders that 
their refusal to honour their legal obligation to negotiate the total elimination 
of their nuclear arsenals is leading to the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
 
 When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the nuclear powers 
made three promises: 
 
· A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be achieved 
by 1996.  Though former U.S. President Bill Clinton was the first to sign the 
Treaty, the succeeding Bush Administration turned its back on it, and entry-
into-force is now effectively blocked. 
 
United Kingdom 200 
France 350 
China 400 
India 35 
Pakistan 48 
Israel 200 
TOTAL 34,145* 
*Data for the U.S. and Russian arsenals is taken 
from the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (see 
www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief23.pdf) and, for 
the other nuclear weapon states, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (see 
www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp).  It should 
be noted that estimates of the composition and 
evolution of the arsenals for China, Israel, India and 
Pakistan are extremely difficult to make and these 
figures are necessarily estimates. 
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· Negotiations on a convention to ban the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons would come to an “early conclusion.”  With 
several nuclear weapons states blocking progress, the Conference on 
Disarmament cannot even agree on a format for negotiations let alone carry 
them out. 
 
· “Systematic and progressive efforts globally” to eliminate 
nuclear weapons would be made.  It is said that the Moscow Treaty of 2002, 
signed by the U.S. and Russia, shows compliance because it will reduce the 
number of deployed strategic warheads on each side to a range of 1,700 to 
2,200 by 2012.  But these weapons will be stored in reserve, not dismantled, 
and there are no verification procedures.  The key principle of irreversibility, 
one of the NPT 13 Steps, is not met. 
 
 In short, the pledges made in 1995 have been abandoned.  The ruling 
of the International Court of Justice that states have an obligation to 
conclude negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons, has been 
ignored.  The “unequivocal undertaking” toward total elimination, given in 
2000, has been pushed aside.  Jayantha Dhanapala, U.N. Under-Secretary-
General for Disarmament Affairs, calls the gulf between declaration and 
deeds “alarming.”  Instead of genuine progress in nuclear disarmament, the 
world has seen the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
the development of improved nuclear weapons, the prospect of more nuclear 
tests, and plans for the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear 
weapon states.  Each day, the warning of the Canberra Commission rings 
more true:  “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant 
stimulus to others to acquire them.”  North Korea is but one current 
example. 
 
During 2001, the Bush Administration conducted a Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR), which made clear that its nuclear weapons stockpile remains 
a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy.  The NPR establishes 
expansive plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear forces, and all the elements that 
support them, within a New Triad of capabilities that combine nuclear and 
conventional offensive strikes with missile defences and nuclear-weapons 
infrastructure.  The NPR assumes that nuclear weapons will be part of U.S. 
military forces for at least the next 50 years; it plans an extensive and 
expensive series of programs to modernize the existing force, including a 
new ICBM to be operational in 2020 and a new heavy bomber in 2040.  The 
NPR says that there are four reasons to possess nuclear weapons:  to “assure 
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allies and friends”; “dissuade competitors”; “deter aggressors”; and “defeat 
enemies.” 
 
 It also lists specific scenarios for using nuclear weapons:  A conflict 
with China over Taiwan, a North Korean attack on South Korea, and an 
attack by Iraq on Israel or another neighbour.  The new policy means that the 
United States will threaten the use of nuclear weapons against countries that 
do not themselves possess nuclear weapons; such an action runs counter to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Thus, under the guise of participating in 
nuclear disarmament through the dismantling of excess nuclear weapons, the 
U.S. is actually widening the role of nuclear weapons far beyond the 
deterrence measures against the former Soviet Union in the Cold War.  New 
U.S. policy directly challenges Canadian policy, which holds that the only 
value of nuclear weapons is political, not military.  U.S. intentions are stated 
clearly in the NPR: 
 
Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defence capabilities 
of the United States, its allies and friends.  They provide 
credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, 
including WMD and large-scale conventional military force.  
These nuclear capabilities possess unique proportions that give 
the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that 
are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives. 
 
When the NPR is seen in the context of President Bush’s National 
Security Strategy, an alarming prospect of the use of nuclear weapons comes 
into view.  The new Strategy says that the U.S. will take anticipatory action 
to defend itself, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack.  The Strategy states:  “To forestall or prevent ... hostile acts 
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”  
The 2003 war against Iraq flowed from this strategy. 
 
Further, the U.S. has stated that it “reserves the right to respond with 
overwhelming force – including through resort to all of our options – to the 
use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and 
allies” (emphasis added).  Has Canada given its assent to be included in such 
a policy?  If so, were Canadians ever informed of the implications?  If not, 
has Canada protested being included in a contravention of international law? 
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 Concerned about a widened rationale for the use of nuclear weapons, 
ten U.S. senators, led by Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, 
sent a letter February 21, 2003 to President Bush, expressing “grave 
concern” about U.S. policy.  They rejected a policy contemplating the option 
of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state: 
 
…Such a shift in U.S. policy would deepen the danger of 
nuclear proliferation by effectively telling non-nuclear states 
that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter a potential U.S. 
attack, and by sending a green light to the world’s nuclear states 
that it is permissible to use them.  Is this the lesson we want to 
send to North Korea, India, Pakistan, or any other nuclear 
power? 
 
Faced with a constantly modernizing U.S. nuclear arsenal and new 
high tech systems of which missile defences are only one part, existing  
nuclear weapons states are likely to retain their nuclear stocks.  And more 
states, seeing that nuclear weapons are the currency of power, may follow 
India, Pakistan and Israel’s recourse to acquiring nuclear weapons.  The 
danger of a nuclear catastrophe grows. 
 
 That catastrophe may well be set off by terrorists.  Immediately after 
September 11, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Ground Zero in 
New York and said that, as horrible as the destruction was, how much worse 
it would have been had the terrorists used nuclear devices.  He called on 
nations to “re-double” efforts to implement fully the relevant treaties to stop 
the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.  In the case of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not a multiplication of efforts we are 
witnessing, but a subtraction. 
 
 It is the lack of an enforceable convention to shut off the development 
and production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials that has resulted in 
the new risk of nuclear terrorism.  There has been resolution after resolution 
at the U.N. for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; the resolutions actually pass 
with handsome majorities (although Canada has never voted in favour).  
Public opinion polls throughout the world show that people heavily favour 
the abolition of all nuclear weapons.  But the major states refuse to enter 
such negotiations, so determined are they to preserve their nuclear strength.  
Now the world faces not only the traditional prospect of a nuclear war 
between states but the use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists who steal 
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nuclear materials.  In this new age of suicidal terrorism, the threat of attacks 
using weapons of mass destruction has grown exponentially.  Virtually all 
experts on the subject say it is not a question of whether a nuclear attack will 
occur, but when. 
 
 The new U.S. policies have brought the world to a new moment 
regarding nuclear weapons.  Instead of progress towards elimination, we are 
seeing the dismantling of the non-proliferation regime, constructed so 
laboriously over the past three decades.  NATO is caught up in this 
dismantling.  And so is Canada. 
 
 
C.  Next Steps for Canada 
 
 At the very least, Canada must stop thinking that piecemeal steps, 
such as formulating better reporting requirements, are enough to save the 
NPT.  A more substantive policy is urgently called for.  The erosion of the 
NPT is occurring before our eyes, and present trend lines will lead to its 
collapse.  The end of the NPT would endanger the full gamut of Canada’s 
security policies. 
 
 A regenerated Canadian policy should center around new efforts to 
give life to the following words, contained in the Final Document of the 
NPT 2000 Review, which all NPT states parties agreed to: 
 
… the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only 
absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons. 
 
 World pressure must be mounted on the nuclear weapons states to 
implement these words through the adoption of a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention, banning the production, deployment, and use of nuclear 
weapons.  An obvious place to start is to call for a U.N. Security Council 
Summit on all Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which the nuclear weapons 
powers would have to face up to their responsibilities.  Since it does not 
appear that the permanent members of the Security Council (i.e., the 
declared nuclear weapons states) are disposed to hold such a Summit, then it 
is logical to advance the longstanding request of U.N. Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan to the international community to hold an international 
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conference on nuclear dangers.  All states, not just NPT adherents, would be 
invited. 
 
In advancing this proposal through a resolution at the U.N., and even 
offering to hold the conference in Canada, the Government would strengthen 
both the NPT and the role of the United Nations in nuclear disarmament.  It 
would focus the attention of the world on the overarching fact that the only 
way to guarantee safety from a nuclear weapons attack is through 
elimination backed up by an intensive verification regime.  This would be a 
bold move by Canada, wholly consistent with its stated policy of seeking the 
total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.  Moreover, such a 
concerted campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons would advance 
another important Canadian objective:  strengthening the legal regime that 
underpins the multilateral system. 
 
This concentrated attention on the objective of nuclear disarmament – 
the elimination of nuclear weapons through the adoption of a universal 
convention – will re-focus the attention of the public in an intelligible way.  
It must be emphasized that the object of this exercise is not just to talk about 
the growing nuclear dangers, but to take action.  The millions around the 
world who marched recently for peace show the growing public aversion to 
war.  People – and governments – seeking to lessen the risk of catastrophe 
through the elimination of nuclear weapons must be listened to. 
 
 It is recognized that advancing such a policy may incur the 
displeasure, if not the hostility, of the United States.  It must be explained 
that the object of the policy is not to counter the U.S., but to advance 
Canadian interests in breaking out of the incoherent posture we and NATO 
are now in, and also to save the legal regime for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons.  It is entirely proper for a friendly neighbour to point out to the 
U.S. that its nuclear weapons policies must implement legal commitments.  
Moreover, it is also proper for Canada to remind the U.S. of what it 
promised concerning compliance:  “We must ensure compliance with 
relevant international agreements, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons 
Convention.”  (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
September 17, 2002, p.2).  Canada should point out that the holding of an 
international conference would be a method of supporting the U.S. in 
building broad international support for universal compliance with existing 
regimes. 
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 Canada must admit, frankly, that the ambiguities and contradictions of 
the present moment are no longer tolerable in a world of escalating nuclear 
danger.   U.S. policies, which dominate the NATO position on nuclear 
weapons, must be clarified.  France and the U.K. have been saying for a long 
time that they will join in nuclear disarmament negotiations once the 
numbers of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. and Russia are substantially 
(and definitively) reduced.  Russia, as a “junior” (and aspiring to be a 
“senior”) member of NATO, will not cling to a nuclear system it can no 
longer afford.  Smaller NATO countries, like Germany, Belgium and 
Denmark question NATO’s nuclear policy. Many countries outside the 
NATO club, such as China, have consistently voted at the U.N. for a Nuclear 
Weapons Convention. 
 
 Thus, Canadian leadership at this moment would be realistic as well 
as courageous.  Canada has the credibility to launch such a campaign.  It has 
tried to move NATO forward; it has voted for the New Agenda Coalition 
omnibus resolution.  Canada is now instrumentally positioned to be a 
“bridge” between NATO and the New Agenda Coalition3.  It could 
meaningfully transmit New Agenda views to NATO and vice versa.  Closing 
the gap between the two would be a signal act of leadership on nuclear 
disarmament and go a long way to ensuring the survival of the NPT after the 
2005 Review. 
 
 Canadian Pugwash is not suggesting that Canada’s policies on nuclear 
weapons elimination should rely solely on the holding of an international 
conference.  Rather, the conference would be a method of stimulating 
renewed international energy into fulfilling priority steps for nuclear 
disarmament.  The following priorities, suggested by the Middle Powers 
Initiative,4 are endorsed by Canadian Pugwash.  We urge the Government of 
Canada to incorporate them and work actively with the New Agenda 
Coalition for their fulfillment: 
1. Strategic arm s reductions: Implement the May 2002 U.S.-Russian 
strategic nuclear arms treaty in accordance with NPT principles so that 
reduced warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a 
transparent and verifiable manner; de-alert remaining deployed U.S. and 
                                                 
3 The New Agenda Coalition includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. 
 
4  “Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context:”  Middle Powers 
Initiative Briefing Paper, August 1, 2002. 
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Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further 
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. 
2. Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles: Negotiate 
regarding plans for missile defenses to avoid obstruction of the process of 
nuclear arms control and disarmament and to promote international stability 
and the principle of undiminished security for all; prevent missile 
proliferation, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, and 
through developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and 
missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation 
objectives. 
3. Tactical arms reductions: Unilaterally remove U.S. bombs deployed 
under NATO auspices in Europe; create a wider process of control of U.S. 
and Russian tactical weapons, including through a) reporting on the 1991-
1992 Presidential initiatives; b) formalizing those initiatives, including 
verification; c) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocally 
exchanging information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; 
and d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic 
nuclear weapons. 
4. Non-use of nuclear weapons: Reverse trends toward expansion of 
options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon 
countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; establish the 
absolute refusal of middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral 
security alliances with the United States to participate in or support first use 
of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use. 
5. Ban on nuclear testing: Observe the moratorium on nuclear testing; 
achieve entry into force of the CTBT; close the test sites in Nevada and 
Novaya Zemlya; renounce development of new or modified nuclear 
weapons as contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of 
nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation of 
cessation of the nuclear arms race. 
6. Control of fissile materials: Building on heightened awareness of the 
threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, a) create a process of 
accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis 
in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and 
verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all 
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weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons; b) commence 
negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and c) mandate and increase funding 
of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and 
facilities against acts of terrorism. 
*         *          * 
 These are the steps the international community and Canada need to 
take in order to move toward a nuclear weapons-free future and a more 
secure world. By hosting such an international conference, Canada would be 
acting consistently, reflecting its record as the only country during the Cold 
War that had the ability and resources to develop nuclear weapons — but 
refrained from doing so. The federal government also has considerable 
experience organizing international conferences where international norms 
were substantively changed because of Canadian efforts. The Ottawa 
Landmines Process and the International Criminal Court are only two such 
examples. 
 
 An international conference needs to be preceded by a sustained effort 
to stimulate the public’s interest so that individuals feel they, too, can make 
a difference. Representatives from various non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) could hold a preparatory conference, attended by experts, concerned 
citizens and youth from across Canada and around the world.  It would also 
be important to hold prior workshops with leaders in disarmament and 
experts in arms control from NATO and New Agenda Coalition countries.  
A Canadian-sponsored conference might help to stimulate a sea change in 
opinion, prompting politicians, the international media and ministries of 
foreign affairs and defence to take notice. 
 
 The federal government has taken a lead role before in moving world 
opinion. Canadians are proud of Lester B. Pearson’s efforts to establish 
peacekeeping forces, Pierre Trudeau’s opening up to China and his peace 
initiative, Brian Mulroney’s efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, André 
Ouellet’s report to the UN on rapid reaction forces and Lloyd Axworthy’s 
Landmines initiative. With the prospect of nuclear war looming, the time is 
urgent for Canada to take such an initiative to assure our world a safer 
future.  
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APPENDIX “A” 
(The following excerpt from the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference 
contains the 13 Practical Steps agreed to by all parties to the NPT) 
15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and 
progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and 
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament': 
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without 
conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into 
force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions 
pending entry into force of that Treaty. 
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-
discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning 
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate 
contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a 
programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on 
such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate 
subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on 
Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate 
establishment of such a body. 
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other 
related arms control and reduction measures. 
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total 
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States 
Parties are committed under Article VI. 
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of 
START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a 
cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic 
offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. 
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8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United 
States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that 
promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for 
all: 
· Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals 
unilaterally.  
· Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear 
weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI 
and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on 
nuclear disarmament.  
· The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral 
initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament 
process.  
· Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear 
weapons systems.  
· A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk 
that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total 
elimination.  
· The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the 
process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.  
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile 
material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under 
IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of 
such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently 
outside of military programmes.  
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament 
process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all 
States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 
Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', 
and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. 
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to 
provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the 
achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
 
 
 
